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Č L A N C I
INTRODUCTION
The idea of fl exicurity has become one 
of the most prominent recommendations 
in the fi eld of employment in the European 
Union (EU). As it strives for fl exibility 
while maintaining high level of social se-
curity, it poses a great challenge to rather 
rigid European labour markets, especially 
in the context of demographic ageing and 
labour market segmentation problems, in-
tense globalization and rapid technological 
developments. Namely, on one hand, fi rms 
need fl exible labour market to quickly adapt 
their workforce to changing conditions and 
stay competitive. On the other hand, labour 
market should ensure security in terms of 
protecting employees from losing their 
jobs and enabling them to enter, remain 
and progress in employment through their 
life-cycle (see European Expert Group on 
Flexicurity, 2007).
The EU promotes fl exicurity through 
four policy elements: (i) fl exible and reliable 
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contractual relations, (ii) lifelong learning 
(LLL), (iii) active labour market policies 
(ALMPs), and (iv) social security system. 
The main objective of this paper was to 
study how do these fl exicurity components 
affect labour market outcomes in the EU 
Member States. As each of the elements 
presents a complex indicator, we based 
our analysis on representative variables 
of fl exicurity, used also by the European 
Commission (EC, 2007a). We were there-
fore interested, whether Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) index, par-
ticipation in LLL programmes and expen-
ditures for active and passive labour market 
policies (ALMPs and PLMPs, respectively)1 
are associated with employment, unemploy-
ment and long-term unemployment rates 
among the EU Member States. The esti-
mates were obtained using panel regression 
models based on data for 20 EU countries 
between 1990 and 2008. 
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 briefl y explains the concept 
of fl exicurity and its components, followed 
by an overview of empirical studies on the 
relationship between individual fl exicurity 
variables and labour market outcomes in 
Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview 
of the implementation situation of individ-
ual fl exicurity policy components across 
the EU Member States. Section 5 presents 
methodology and data. Section 6 employs 
panel regression methods to analyse the 
relation between fl exicurity policy compo-
nents and labour market outcomes. Section 
7 concludes.
THE CONCEPT OF 
FLEXICURITY 
The notion of fl exicurity presents an 
oxymoron that combines two concepts (i.e., 
fl exibility and security) that were previously 
seen in opposition.2 It was fi rst employed in 
the context of labour market reforms in the 
Netherlands during the mid-1990s, which 
resulted in the adoption of the Flexibility 
and Security Act and the Act concerning the 
Allocation of Workers via Intermediaries. 
These acts aimed to ease rules for dismiss-
al and rules for starting a temporary work 
agency and to provide for higher level of 
security for employees in fl exible jobs (see 
Keune and Jepsen, 2007; Wilthagen and 
Tros, 2004). Although the idea of fl exicu-
rity has been activated in the Netherlands, 
it is today often associated with the Danish 
labour market. The Danish “golden trian-
gle” namely presents a prime example of a 
well-functioning fl exicurity arrangement. It 
combines fl exible labour market (i.e., high 
degree of occupational and geographical 
job mobility due to low employment pro-
tection), high social security (i.e., generous 
system of unemployment benefi ts, UBs) and 
ALMPs aimed at skill improvement and 
activation of unemployed.3
Flexicurity is today in the core of aca-
demic and political debate on labour market 
1 As the institutional variables for generosity of income replacement during unemployment were not avai-
lable for the entire studied period, we use expenditures for PLMPs as a proxy of unemployment benefi ts (UBs) 
generosity. Namely, our analysis showed that countries with higher expenditures for PLMPs, on average, pro-
vide higher income replacement during unemployment (relation is statistically signifi cant at 5% level of signi-
fi cance); results are available on request.
2 The term fl exicurity was probably chosen because of its appeal as a win–win solution, both for workers 
and employers, and due to its broadness, which allows everybody to put their preferred version of defi nition 
under its umbrella. However, the importance of the term rose by its adoption in the institutional language of the 
European Commission (Auer, 2010).
3 Although the Danish golden triangle presents a successful model of fl exicurity, this is not the guarantee that 
the same model would also be effective in other countries. A review of possible reasons why implementation 
might fail in other countries is available in de Groot and Elhorst (2010) and Algan and Cahuc (2006).
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reforms. Even though its importance within 
the employment agenda is rising, the con-
cept of fl exicurity remains ill defi ned. The 
most widely used defi nition comes from 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004: 14) who defi ne 
fl exicurity as “… a policy strategy that 
attempts, synchronically and in a coor-
dinated way, to enhance the fl exibility of 
labour markets, the work organization 
and labour relations on the one hand, 
and to enhance security – employment 
security and social security – notably 
for weaker groups in and outside the la-
bour market on the other hand.” As this 
defi nition recognizes fl exicurity mainly as 
a deliberate political choice, they also intro-
duced a defi nition which refers to fl exicurity 
as a state of affairs. This means that it takes 
into account the degree of job, employment, 
income and combination security and the 
degree of numerical (both external an in-
ternal), functional and wage fl exibility. The 
third understanding of fl exicurity is as an 
analytical tool that can be used to analyse 
developments in fl exibility and security and 
to compare national labour market systems 
(Bredgaard et al., 2006; Madsen, 2007). 
According to the above defi nitions, both 
fl exibility and security are multi-dimen-
sional concepts, each of them including 
four dimensions. In order to identify differ-
ent fl exicurity policies, Wilthagen and Tros 
(2004) constructed a matrix that comprised 
all dimensions of fl exibility and security, re-
sulting in 16 different combinations which 
should all lead to win-win situations in the 
labour market. Nevertheless, the matrix has 
been subjected to several critics. For in-
stance, Leschke et al. (2006) criticized the 
assumption of trade-off between fl exibility 
and security and pointed that fl exibility-se-
curity nexus should refl ect a complementary 
relationship, therefore demanding a more 
dynamic approach. Moreover, they men-
tioned that fl exibility-security nexus could 
lead to a downward spiral and losses for 
both employer and employee. To avoid the 
latter, they proposed to integrate fl exicu-
rity concept in a transitional labour market 
policy approach.4 Keune and Jepsen (2007) 
believed that large number of combinations 
might render fl exicurity as a vague or am-
biguous concept. Moreover, Tangian (2004) 
and Bertozzi and Bonoli (2009) emphasized 
the question of how to effectively measure 
fl exicurity dimensions.5 
Probably the main reason why fl exicu-
rity has become such a key concept is its 
adoption and promotion by the EC. The 
search for balance between fl exibility and 
security is especially evident within the 
European Employment Strategy. Namely, 
according to the Council of the EU, fl exi-
curity presents a toll that would positively 
affect competitiveness of fi rms, enhance 
quality and productivity at work and facili-
tate adaptation of employers and employees 
to economic changes (Council Decision 
2003/578/EC). Flexicurity was therefore 
the European answer to the “fl exibility-of-
labour-markets-will-bring-about-economic-
and-employment-growth-and-welfare-for-
all” mantra of the neoliberal kind, associ-
ated with former employment successes in 
the United States (Auer, 2007).
The term fl exicurity was in the EU rheto-
ric for the fi rst time included with the adop-
tion of the European Council’s Presidency 
conclusions in 2006. The European Council 
labelled fl exicurity as a measure to increase 
employment opportunities and thereby in-
vited Member States to follow the fl exi-
curity approach when performing labour 
market policies. To encourage Member 
States to implement fl exicurity policies, 
the European Expert Group on Flexicurity 
4 Transitional labour market policy approach focuses on solutions for the fl exibilisation of employment in 
order to ease transitions in and out of the labour market (Rogowski, 2009).
5 An overview of criticism of fl exicurity nexus is available also in Bredgaard and Larsen (2007).
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in 2007 presented four pathways to fl exicu-
rity: i) tackling contractual segmentation; ii) 
developing fl exicurity within fi rms and of-
fering transition security; iii) tackling skills 
and opportunity gaps among the workforce; 
and iv) improving opportunities for benefi t 
recipients and informally employed workers. 
In the same year the EC (2007b) translated 
pathways into four policy components:
1. Flexible and reliable contractual ar-
rangements, both for employers and 
employees, ensured through modern 
labour laws and work organization.
2. Comprehensive LLL strategies to ad-
dress challenges of rapid technological de-
velopment and innovation.6 LLL presents 
a crucial factor for keeping up productivity 
levels, competitiveness of fi rms and long-
term employability of workers through 
continuous investment in skills.
3. Effective ALMPs to help people to cope 
with rapid change, facilitate transitions to 
employment through job placement serv-
ices and programmes, improve effi ciency 
of job match matching and contribute to 
the reduction of unemployment.
4. Modern social security systems to pro-
vide for adequate UBs, which would act 
as a safety net during job changes and 
would not pull people out of the labour 
market. This also includes provisions 
that help people to combine private and 
work responsibilities. 
EC (2007b) stresses that crucial precon-
ditions for effective implementation of the 
above mentioned policies are involvement 
of all social partners and well-established 
social dialogue. Furthermore, these fl exi-
curity policies should be pursued in a wider 
context of sound macro- and microeconomic 
policies and embedded in a wider framework 
of labour market regulation and employ-
ment rights (European Expert Group on 
Flexicurity, 2007). It should be also taken into 
consideration that fl exicurity is not a uniform 
one single model, but it should be shaped for 
every national situation individually. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON 
FLEXICURITY COMPONENTS 
AND THEIR EFFECTS 
In this section we present a brief over-
view of empirical studies on the relations 
between fl exicurity components and la-
bour market performance. We focus on 
the following fl exicurity variables: EPL 
index, LLL programmes, ALMPs and both 
PLMPs and UBs.
Employment protection legislation
EPL and its effects has been a subject 
of a large body of theoretical and empirical 
literature. For instance, Kosi and Bojnec 
(2012) explained that EPL theoretically af-
fects industry dynamics and thus the labour 
market in different directions. On one hand, 
strict EPL prevents a fi rm from fi ring its em-
ployees (or makes it costly to do so) and in 
turn inhibits business and job creation. On 
the other hand, it stimulates employees to 
invest in fi rm- or job specifi c human capi-
tal. Nevertheless, economists have not yet 
reached a consensus on the direction and 
magnitude of the association between EPL 
and labour market outcomes, especially with 
regard to unemployment. 
As regards the impact of EPL on unem-
ployment, Nickell et al. (2001) found that EPL 
affects structural unemployment, mainly 
through its impact on raising unemployment 
persistence. Similarly, Scarpetta (1996) and 
Elmeskov et al. (1998) showed that EPL in-
creases structural unemployment and non-
employment, especially for youth and long-
6 Intangible factors are deemed to be the fundamental source of competitive advantages in today’s knowled-
ge economy (Jerman et al., 2010).
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term unemployed. Kugler and Saint-Paul 
(2004) found that restrictions on fi ring re-
duced incentives for fi rms to hire unemployed 
and lengthen unemployment spells for work-
ers in the United States. No signifi cant effect 
on unemployment was found, for example, in 
the studies performed by Baker et al. (2004), 
Belot and van Ours (2004), Heckman and 
Pages (2000) and OECD (1999). 
Concerning the effect of EPL on employ-
ment, OECD (2004) argued that it is possi-
ble to detect a negative relationship between 
strict EPL and employment rates of youth 
and prime-age women, whereas links to the 
employment rates of other groups may be 
positive. Schivardi and Torrini (2008) found 
only modest evidence that strict EPL reduced 
fi rm incentives to increase employment in 
Italian fi rms. Also Boeri and Jimeno (2005) 
and Kugler and Pica (2008) reported about 
negative effects of strict EPL on job turno-
ver in Italian fi rms. Stricter employment 
regulations, namely, may decrease fi rms’ 
business expectations, which may reduce 
their willingness to employ (Stubelj, 2010). 
Recent analyses of gross worker and job 
fl ows performed with the use of difference-
in-differences estimators on a cross-section 
of industry-level data showed that strict dis-
missal regulations reduce job turnover or 
gross worker fl ows, by which the negative 
relationship is stronger in industries where 
the need for labour reallocation is higher 
(see Micco and Pages, 2006; Bassanini et 
al., 2010; Haltiwanger et al., 2010; Cingano 
et al., 2010). Reduced job and worker fl ows 
result in worse job opportunities for workers, 
whereas their association with employment 
levels is ambiguous (for overview of studies 
see OECD, 2010).
Lifelong learning
Labour market effects of LLL have been 
subjected to less research. Based on the 
sample of 19 countries, the OECD (2004) 
showed that individuals, especially women, 
older and low-paid workers, who received 
training, recorded, on average, lower unem-
ployment rates and thereby greater chances 
of keeping their employment than their non-
trained counterparts. In addition, trained 
workers enjoyed relatively good re-employ-
ment chances and tended to quit for better 
jobs more often and separated less often 
against their will. Likewise, overview in 
Employment in Europe 2006 report showed 
that high participation in LLL positively 
associates with high employment and low 
long-term unemployment (EC, 2006). These 
fi ndings were confi rmed also on country 
levels. For illustration, Jenkins et al. (2003) 
analysed the impact of participation in LLL 
programmes on employment prospects in 
the United Kingdom. Authors showed that 
British workers who were out of the labour 
market at the beginning of the 1990s were 
more likely to be in work in 2000 if they 
had acquired a formal qualifi cation in the 
interim. Dieckhoff (2007) showed that con-
tinued training had a signifi cant positive 
effect on transition from unemployment to 
employment in Germany, Denmark and in 
the United Kingdom and strong effects on 
the probability of transition into higher-level 
occupations in Germany and Denmark.7 
Active labour market policies
ALMPs and EPL should be understood 
as complementary, as ALMPs, to some 
extent, reduce negative labour market out-
comes effects caused by employment pro-
tection regulations (de Groot and Elhorst, 
2010). Namely, properly designed ALMPs 
can reduce unemployment by improving job 
matching effi ciency and skills of unemployed 
(see Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Positive ef-
fects of ALMPs on reducing unemployment 
were confi rmed by several macroeconomic 
7 On similar issue for Slovene managers see also Bertoncelj and Kovac (2009) and Bertoncelj (2010).
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studies, however they disagree on the mag-
nitude of the effect (see Scarpetta, 1996; 
Elmeskov et al., 1998; Nickell and Layard, 
1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Boone 
and van Ours, 2004; Bassanini and Duval, 
2006; Fialová and Schneider, 2009). 
With regard to the type of ALMPs em-
ployed, recent meta-analysis of 97 stud-
ies on ALMPs, conducted by Card et al. 
(2010), showed that subsidized public sector 
employment programmes are less effective 
compared to other ALMPs. Additionally, au-
thors showed that classroom and on-the-job 
training programmes record positive medi-
um-term effects on labour market outcomes, 
however are ineffective in the short-term. 
Similar fi ndings were reported also by earlier 
overviews of literature, including Heckman 
et al. (1999) and Kluve and Schmidt (2002). 
On the contrary, Calmfors et al. (2001) found 
that labour market retraining in Sweden had 
no or had negative effects on employment. 
Munch and Skipper (2003) argued that pub-
lic job training programmes in Denmark re-
duced the effort of unemployed to fi nd regu-
lar jobs and therefore lead to so called lock-
ing-in effect. Similar fi ndings (for OECD 
countries) were presented also by Martin and 
Grubb (2001). Likewise, Hujer et al. (2009) 
showed that labour market programmes had 
no positive effects on outfl ows from unem-
ployment in Western Germany.
Passive labour market policies and 
unemployment benefi ts
PLMPs have an ambiguous effect on 
labour market performance. On one hand, 
they are useful for protecting the standard 
of unemployed, whereas on the other, they 
can lead to job matching ineffi ciency and to 
worker and job fl ows decline, mostly due to 
reduced job search intensity and motivation 
of unemployed (see Fialová and Schneider, 
2009). If we concentrate on UBs (as a pre-
vailing part of the PLMPs), they can affect 
labour market performance through various 
channels, including job search intensity, 
reservation wages, wage bargaining proc-
ess, level of riskiness, and productivity of 
newly created jobs. Most microeconometric 
studies found that generous UBs (in terms 
of duration and benefi t level) increase the 
duration of unemployment spells (for sur-
veys of literature see Krueger and Meyer, 
2002; Holmlund, 1998; OECD, 2010). For 
example, van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) 
showed that reduction of potential UBs du-
ration in Slovenia contributed to signifi cant 
reduction of unemployment spells of benefi t 
recipients and therefore to increased prob-
ability to take a job, without compromising 
on the quality of the post-unemployment job 
as measured by wage level, duration of job, 
and type of employment (regular vs. fi xed-
term). About minor, and sometimes insig-
nifi cant, UBs effects on job match quality 
and on creation of higher productivity jobs 
reported also Lalive (2007) and Caliendo 
et al. (2009). Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) 
confi rmed a negative relationship between 
average gross replacement rates and em-
ployment-unemployment transitions also 
on a cross-country level. In similar vein, 
Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov et al. (1998) and 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) reported on 
signifi cant positive impact of various meas-
ures of UBs generosity on unemployment.8 
However, as stated by Bassanini and Duval 
(2006), the undesirable impact of generous 
UBs and other PLMPs on labour market 
performance could be mitigated by in-
creased investments in ALMPs, especially 
in activation measures.
8 Besides this reasoning, we also have to take into account the possibility of benefi ts’ fraud, resulting in in-
creased shadow economy. Namely, people would tend to stay offi cially unemployed and collect UBs, whereas 
they would be active (employed) in the shadow economy. Although the issue of shadow economy is not part of 
the paper, Nastav and Bojnec (2008) and Nastav (2009) clearly indicate that shadow economy has a direct and 
indirect (through UBs and other LMPs) effect on the labour market.
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OVERVIEW OF FLEXICURITY 
COMPONENTS
In order to provide grounds for further 
empirical analysis, we fi rstly present an 
overview of descriptive statistics on per-
formance of the EU Member States with 
regard to fl exicurity policy components. 
Furthermore, we seek for potential corre-
lations between studied policy components 
and labour market outcomes (i.e., employ-
ment, unemployment and long-term unem-
ployment rate). Data needed for analysis 
were mostly obtained from the OECD da-
tabase (OECD.Stat, 2011), Eurostat (2011), 
the ILO database and offi cial reports of the 
OECD (2011a, b) and the EC (2011).
Employment protection legislation
As can be seen from Table 1, EPL strict-
ness varies greatly among the EU Member 
Table 1.
EPL index in the EU Member States, 1990 and 2008
OECD methodologya Version 1 Version 3
Countryb 1990 2008 Change 1990–2008 2008
Austria 2.2 1.9  – 0.3 2.4
Belgium 3.2 2.2 – 1.0 2.6
Bulgariac : : : 2.0
Czech Republic 1.9 2.0 0.1 2.3
Denmark 2.4 1.5 – 0.9 1.9
Estonia 1.9 2.1 0.2 2.4
Finland 2.3 2.0 – 0.3 2.3
France 3.0 3.1 0.1 3.0
Germany 3.2 2.1 – 1.1 2.6
Greece 3.5 2.7 – 0.8 3.0
Hungary 1.3 1.7 0.4 2.1
Ireland 0.9 1.1 0.2 1.4
Italy 3.6 1.9 – 1.7 2.6
Latvia 1.5 2.1 0.6 2.4
Lithuania 1.9 2.6 0.7 2.6
Luxembourg : : : 3.4
Netherlands 2.7 2.0 – 0.7 2.2
Poland 1.4 1.9 0.5 2.4
Romaniad : : : 2.8
Portugal 4.1 3.2 – 0.9 3.1
Slovak Republic 1.8 1.4 – 0.4 2.1
Slovenia 4.1 2.5 – 1.6 2.8
Spain 3.8 3.0 – 0.8 3.1
Sweden 3.5 1.9 – 1.6 2.1
United Kingdom 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.1
Notes:
a  Version 1 of the OECD methodology calculates total EPL index as an unweighted average of the sub-
indicators for regular and temporary contracts, whereas Version 3 as a weighted sum of the sub-indicators 
for regular and temporary contracts and collective dismissals (for more details see OECD, 2011a). 
b  Data for Cyprus and Malta are not available.
c  Data for 2004.
d  Data for 2006.
Countries included in the panel regression analyses are written in italics.
: no data available
Sources: Muravyev, 2010; OECD.Stat, 2011; Tonin, 2009; Vasilica and Mladen, 2009; Vodopivec et al., 2007.
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Figure 1.
Strictness of EPL (version 3) vs. employment rate (a) and unemployment rate (b) in the EU countries, 2008
                                      (a)                                  (b)
Legend:  EU-15; NMS.
Notes: For both studied relations we performed linear regression analyses. Regression estimates are as follows:
           Figure 1(a): y = 75.927 – 3.646 EPL; R2 = 0.12
           Figure 1(b): y = 3.865 + 1.065 EPL; R2 = 0.08
Source: authors’ calculations.
States.9 According to data for 2008, the 
regulation is at most rigid in Luxembourg 
and in Southern or Mediterranean European 
countries and becomes more liberal when 
moving to Scandinavian countries. On the 
contrary, employment regulations are the 
most fl exible in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
i.e., in the United Kingdom and Ireland (see 
Laporšek and Dolenc, 2011). 
Strictness of employment regulation 
converged across EU countries over the past 
18 years (see OECD, 2004). The process 
occurred mainly due to easing of regula-
tion in countries where EPL was relatively 
strict at the end of 1980s. As can be seen 
from Table 1, majority of countries with 
rather high EPL index values at the begin-
ning of the 1990s signifi cantly liberalized 
employment legislation, mostly in the fi eld 
of temporary employment. On the contra-
ry, some countries that in the early 1990s 
employed fl exible employment regulations, 
over the last two decades slightly increased 
their EPL index.
Figure 1 examines bivariate associations 
between EPL and employment and unem-
ployment rate. Scatterplots provide an indi-
cation that EPL associates with lower em-
ployment rate, while the relationship between 
EPL and unemployment rate is negative. 
However, both correlations are statistically 
insignifi cant at 5% level of signifi cance. 
9 EPL index presents a measure of labour market fl exibility and covers three different aspects of employment 
protection: (i) individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts; (ii) additional costs for collective dismi-
ssals; and (iii) regulation on temporary contracts. Until today OECD presented three versions of EPL index 
calculations (see OECD, 2011a).
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Figure 2.
Participation rate in LLL in the early 1990s and 2009 
Source: authors’ calculations.
Lifelong learning
Data on participation of adults in LLL 
programmes point on a large gap and un-
even implementation of these programmes 
across EU countries. As can be seen from 
Figure 2, the gap has not been reduced con-
siderably over the last 19 years, although in 
majority of countries the level of awareness 
about the importance of LLL increased. 
The weakest in this fi eld remain the NMS, 
probably due to economic and labour mar-
ket developments during the transition pe-
riod. More successful in implementing LLL 
policies are Continental EU countries and 
especially Nordic countries.
As regards the relation between partici-
pation in LLL and employment, Figure 3 
demonstrates that investments in creation 
of such programmes may have a stimu-
lating effect on further employability of 
workers, particularly those with lower 
skills. In similar vein, analysis suggests a 
negative relation between participation in 
LLL programmes and long-term unemploy-
ment, showing that the EU countries with 
higher share of adults involved in LLL pro-
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Active labour market policies
As can be seen in Figure 4, only few 
countries increased expenditures for 
ALMPs during the last two decades, by 
which the increase was in most cases only 
minor. The level of expenditures therefore 
remains low, especially among the NMS. 
For comparison, old EU Member States in 
2009 earmarked to ALMPs, on average, 
0.63% of GDP (or 0.10% of GDP per 1 per-
centage point of unemployment), whereas 
the NMS only 0.25% of GDP (or 0.03% of 
GDP per 1 percentage point of unemploy-
ment).10 Expenditures for ALMPs are lower 
in countries with stricter EPL, yet the rela-
tion is not statistically signifi cant. Rather 
low is also the share of expenditures for 
ALMPs among all expenditures for labour 
market policies, as it in 2009 amounted, on 
average, 29.1%. 
Figure 3.
Participation rate in LLL vs. employment rate (a) and long-term unemployment rate (b), EU-27, in %, 2009
                                      (a)                                  (b)
Legend:  EU-15; NMS.
Notes: For both studied relations we performed linear regression analyses. Regression estimates are as follows:
           Figure 3(a): y = 58.606 + 0.610 LLL; R2 = 0.59
           Figure 3(b): y = 3.954 – 0.119 LLL; R2 = 0.41
Source: authors’ calculations.
10 Difference between groups of countries is according to Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test statistically 
signifi cant at 1% signifi cance level.
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Figure 4.
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1990 2009
ALMPs aim to enhance human capital, 
to ensure employability of workers and to 
facilitate unemployment-employment tran-
sitions. This is refl ected in their correlation 
with labour market outcomes. As can be 
seen from Figure 5 and data for 2009, coun-
tries with higher level of expenditures for 
ALMPs record lower unemployment rate 
and, on the other hand, higher employment 
rate than countries, where expenditures are 
lower. Correlations are statistically signifi -
cant at 5% level of signifi cance.
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Figure 5.
Expenditures for ALMPs vs. employment rate (a) and unemployment rate (b) in the EU-27, 2009
                                       (a)                                 (b)
Legend:  EU-15; NMS.
Notes: For both studied relations we performed linear regression analyses. Regression estimates are as follows:
           Figure 5(a): y = 61.022 + 53.291 ALMP/UR; R2 = 0.36
           Figure 5(b): y = 10.952 – 24.863 ALMP/UR; R2 = 0.21
Source: authors’ calculations.
Passive labour market policies and 
unemployment benefi ts
UBs are together with early retirement 
schemes classified under the PLMPs.11 
Compared to the 1990, the level of expen-
ditures for PLMPs decreased in most of the 
studied countries (see Figure 6), indicating 
a potential fall in income support generos-
ity. The decline in PLMPs expenditures 
was especially prominent in Denmark, yet, 
it was partly compensated with an increase 
in expenditures for ALMPs. Similarly as 
with ALMPs, the most generous countries 
in terms of PLMPs include Nordic countries 
along Belgium and Germany. 
Associations between expenditures for 
PLMPs and labour market outcomes run in 
the same direction as in previous, ALMPs 
case. Namely, Figure 7 proposes that high 
expenditures for PLMPs are, in general, re-
lated with higher employment rates and, on 
the other hand, with lower unemployment 
rates. Nevertheless, these relations may be 
doubtful from a theoretical perspective and 
may arise from reverse causality. Namely, 
richer countries can afford higher expen-
ditures for PLMPs12 and at the same time 
achieve good labour market performance. 
11 As the data on the share of PLMPs devoted to UBs are not available for the entire studied period, we pre-
sent data on total expenditures for PLMPs.
12 We fi nd in the analysis that countries with higher GDP p.c. PPP have higher expenditures for PLMPs (re-
lation is statistically signifi cant at 5% level of signifi cance); results are available on request.
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Figure 6.
Expenditure for PLMPs, as % of GDP, 1990 and 2009
Source: authors’ calculations.
Figure 7.
Expenditures for PLMPs vs. employment rate (a) and unemployment rate (b) in the EU-27, 2009
                                           (a)                                (b)
Legend:  EU-15; NMS.
Notes: For both studied relations we performed linear regression analyses. Regression estimates are as follows:
Figure 7(a): y = 60.291 + 33.445 PLMP/UR; R2 = 0.40
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Figure 8. 
NRR for the fi rst seven months of unemployment, 2002 and 2008
Note: Data for Italy in 2002 refer to the fi rst 12 months of unemployment. 
Sources: EC, 2012; OECD, 2011b; OECD.Stat, 2011; authors’ calculations.
Commonly used indicator of UBs gen-
erosity is also net replacement rate for ini-
tial unemployment (NRR).13 It measures 
the effect of the move from employment to 
unemployment on household incomes. On 
average and irrespectively the family type, 
NRR is lower for those with higher pre-
unemployment wages, meaning that when 
moved to unemployment those with lowest 
pre-unemployment wage lose (fi nancially) 
least. On average, at the EU level, those 
with pre-unemployment wage at the level of 
67% of average wage lost 30% of previous 
income in 2009, whereas those with pre-
unemployment wage at the level of 150% 
of average wage lost almost 40% or 50% 
of previous income. Data show that after 
fi ve years of unemployment NRR declines, 
although in some countries still achieves 
high levels. Regarding the duration of 
UBs, the NMS mostly provide benefi ts up 
to maximum duration of 12 months (with 
exception of Slovenia), whereas, on average, 
possible entitlement to UBs lasts longer, in 
Belgium even indefi nitely (for more details 
see Laporšek and Dolenc, 2011). 
Comparing to the early 2000s, major-
ity of the EU Member States reduced the 
replacement rate, therefore reducing the 
generosity of UBs. Despite, workers are at 
most secure in Nordic and some Continental 
EU countries, yet the lowest replacement 
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2002 2008
13 NRR is defi ned as a ratio of net income while out of work to net income while in work. If NRR exceeds 
100 %, the unemployed person is not expected (at least not on short-term basis) to be encouraged to move out of 
unemployment, because in-work earnings are smaller than out-of-work incomes or (alternatively) when moving 
to unemployment the incomes would increase and not (as usually) decrease (Dolenc and Vodopivec, 2005).
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Most of the papers focus on theoreti-
cal aspects of fl exicurity (see for example, 
Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Madsen, 2007; 
European Expert Group on Flexicurity, 
2007), whereas only few investigate the em-
pirical effects of all fl exicurity components, 
simultaneously, on labour market outcomes 
(see, for example, de Groot and Elhorst, 
2010; Tangian, 2010). In the continuation 
of this paper we in more detail examine 
the relationships between labour market 
outcomes (i.e., employment, unemployment 
and long-term unemployment rate) and four 
fl exicurity elements that represent the un-
derlying fundamentals of the concept within 
the EU: (1) EPL to present fl exibility of con-
tractual arrangements; (2) participation of 
adults in LLL programmes; (3) government 
expenditures for ALMPs; and (4) govern-
ment expenditures for PLMPs as a proxy 
of generosity income replacement policies 
during unemployment (i.e., UBs). Relations 
were estimated using panel regression anal-
ysis, performed on the sample of 20 EU 
countries over the 1990–2008 period.14,15 





denotes employment rate, unem-
ployment rate and long-term unemployment 
rate in subsequent regression analyses.16 
EPL refers to overall EPL index (accord-
ing to the OECD Version 1) in country i 
in time t, LLL is participation in LLL pro-
grammes, ALMP refers to expenditures for 
active employment programmes as % of 
gross domestic product, yet PLMP presents 
expenditures for passive employment poli-
cies (as % of GDP). Both ALMP and PLMP 
were normalized to the size of unemploy-
ment. In order to control for labour market 
situation, we include tax wedge (TW) for 
single person without children earning av-
erage wage as a measure of labour taxation 
and trade union density (TUD) as a measure 
of trade union’s presence. As a control for 
differences in macroeconomic environment 
and development we use GDP at purchasing 
power parity per capita (GDPpc) and GDP 
growth (GDPg). Ψ and ϒ are vectors of re-
gression coeffi cients, measuring, respect-
fully, the effect of explanatory variables and 
the effect of control variables. Parameter ε
i,t
 
refers to random error.
Following the strategy of Bertola et al. 
(2001), we re-estimated the above basic 
regression function with inclusion of year 
dummies (vector Λ). In this way we take 
into account effects that may influence 
all countries in a given year in the same 
way (for example, world-wide shocks) (see 
Wooldridge, 2002):
(2)
To summarize, in the panel regression 
analysis we differentiated between two 
14 The panel included Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Fran-
ce, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and the 
United Kingdom. Other EU Member States were left out due to the lack of data.
15 Decision on the length of studied period was motivated by two facts: i) availability of data for the NMS 
included in the analysis; ii) going further back in the past would not bring clear results in most of the NMS due 
to changed political and economic situation.
16 Data on employment, unemployment and long-term unemployment rate were collected on the basis of 
Labour Force Surveys and refer to the age group 15 to 64.
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model specifi cations, i.e., with and with-
out control for year effects. In addition, 
relations between fl exicurity policies and 
labour market performance were (across 
different model specifi cations) estimated 
both using fi xed and random effects. With 
the use of fi xed effects we controlled for 
country-specifi c effects. Yet, due to the 
short time series and possible low variation 
in data for EPL strictness, fi xed effects es-
timations could be imprecise. On the other 
hand, random effects estimations allowed 
us to assume that variations across countries 
(or time) are random and uncorrelated with 
the independent variable, resulting also in 
smaller standard errors than fi xed effects. 
However, if explanatory variables are corre-
lated with country’s error term, the random 
effects could lead to biased estimations (see 
Wooldridge, 2002). Following the strategy 
applied also by Heckman and Pages (2000), 
we therefore performed and compared both 
fi xed and random effects estimations and 
by that tried to avoid biases that could arise 
from different estimations methodologies.17 
All regression models were controlled for 
heteroskedacity and autocorrelation using 
robust standard errors.18 
Regarding the data, missing estimations 
for EPL index for Slovenia were obtained 
from Vodopivec et al. (2007), whereas es-
timations for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
from Muravyev (2010). Missing historical 
time series for expenditures for ALMPs, 
PLMPs and labour taxation of average 
worker were collected from the CEP-OECD 
institutions dataset (Nickell, 2006). Time 
series data for trade union density were 
obtained from Visser (2011).19
PANEL REGRESSION 
ESTIMATES
An overview of fl exicurity policies in 
Section 4 pointed on the existence of po-
tential relations between chosen individual 
fl exicurity components and labour market 
outcomes. In this section we are expanding 
these analyses by estimating the association 
between all four fl exicurity components and 
various labour market outcomes. Relations 
were evaluated using panel regression anal-
yses conducted on the panel of 20 European 
countries over the 1990–2008 period. 
Estimation results are summarized in Table 
2. For each of the dependent variables we 
present both fi xed and random effects esti-
mates, by which we differentiate between 
two types of model specifi cations: without 
and with control for year effects. A detailed 
explanation of the methodological scope of 
the panel regression analyses is available in 
Section 5.20
The fi rst two columns of Table 2 present 
estimates on the association between 
fl exicurity variables and employment rate 
among the EU countries. As can be seen, 
regression estimates are similar across dif-
ferent estimation methodologies and model 
specifi cations. On overall, estimates suggest 
statistically signifi cant negative relation be-
tween EPL index and employment rate, in-
dicating that rigid employment regulations 
reduce willingness of fi rms to hire new 
17 The estimates of Hausman test showed that fi xed effects models are more appropriate for analysis. Howe-
ver, to avoid biases and due to possible low variation in EPL within countries we performed also an analysis 
with random effects. 
18 The presence of heteroskedacity and autocorrelation was confi rmed by likelihood-ratio test and Woold-
rige test, respectively. Statistics can be obtained from the authors. 
19 Missing data on participation of adults in LLL programmes in NMS within the 1990–1998 period were 
calculated using the trend line evaluation techniques.
20 We have also tried another model specifi cation with a control for differences between old and new (transi-
tion) EU Member States. Regression estimates did not differ a lot from results presented in this section. Results 
of the additional model specifi cation can be obtained from the authors.
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workers and by that lead to decline in the 
job turnover. On the other hand, regression 
estimates for government expenditures for 
ALMPs and participation rate in LLL are 
positive, suggesting that activation meas-
ures enhance human capital of workers 
and therefore increase their probability to 
employ. The analysis also suggests a statis-
tically signifi cant positive relation between 
passive employment measures and employ-
ment, possibly indicating the impact of 
PLMPs on raising the overall labour force 
participation rate. The re-estimation of the 
basic model (i.e., model 1) with inclusion of 
year dummies to control that all countries 
are in the same way affected by the world-
wide shocks (see model 2) does not change 
the direction of the regression estimates and 
their statistical signifi cance, confi rming the 
robustness of our results. Second set of re-
gression models studies the relation between 
fl exicurity variables and unemployment rate. 
In contrast to previous models, estimates be-
tween different model specifi cations differ, 
especially with regard to EPL index. As can 
be seen from Table 2, when extending the 
baseline model with year dummies, regres-
sion estimates for employment regulation 
change their sign, remaining statistically 
insignifi cant. This is in line with theoretical 
and empirical literature, which reported on 
ambiguous fi ndings on the impact of employ-
ment regulation strictness on labour market 
performance (for overview see OECD, 2004; 
Boeri and van Ours, 2008). This may be also 
related with several drawbacks of EPL as 
a measure of rigidity of labour market (for 
discussion on this issue see Boeri and van 
Ours, 2008). 
As regards ALMPs, regression esti-
mates (in both model specifi cations) sug-
gest that countries with higher ALMPs have 
lower unemployment rate, ceteris paribus. 
This implies that ALMPs by enhancing 
workers’ skills and knowledge improve 
their chances of getting work and chances 
of staying in employment. On desirable 
effects of ALMPs on reducing unemploy-
ment reported also other macroeconomic 
empirical studies (see for example, Boone 
and van Ours, 2004, Bassanini and Duval, 
2006, Fialová and Schneider, 2009). On the 
other hand, the relation between PLMPs 
and unemployment tends to be positive, 
what is opposite to the results of the bivari-
ate analysis performed in Section 4. Yet, the 
latter was conducted only on data for one 
year, i.e., 2009, when the labour markets 
started to feel the impacts of the economic 
crisis and were therefore confronted with 
an increasing unemployment. Nevertheless, 
the positive panel regression estimates be-
tween PLMPs and unemployment may 
imply that PLMPs, especially income re-
placement during unemployment, reduce 
search effort and/or increase reservation 
wages, resulting in a decline of unemploy-
ment-employment transitions. However, as 
suggested by Howell et al. (2007), posi-
tive correlation between unemployment 
and benefi t replacement rates should be 
interpreted as a causality running from the 
former to the latter. 
In the third set of regression models 
we observe associations between flexi-
curity policy components and long-term 
unemployment rate. Similarly as in the 
previous case, a negative relation can be 
observed between long-term unemploy-
ment and ALMPs and participation in 
LLL programmes. This again signifi es the 
importance of effective ALMPs and LLL 
programmes, which through training, pre-
qualifi cation and other employment incen-
tives reduce unemployment, especially in 
the long run. On the other hand, strictness 
of employment regulation and PLMPs posi-
tively associate with long-term unemploy-
ment, however relations are statistically 
insignifi cant. 
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Table 2.
Estimation results of the panel regression analyses
Dependent variable Employment rate Unemployment rate
Long-term 
unemployment rate
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


















































































































































































































































R2: 0.41 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31
Membership dummies No No No No No No
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 377 377 377 377 377 377
Signifi cance level: * 1%, **5%, ***10%. Robust standard errors reported within parentheses.
Source: authors’ calculations.
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Out of the remaining explanatory vari-
ables are of special interest also tax wedge 
and trade union density. Regarding the fi rst, 
estimates show that labour taxation has a 
potential detrimental effect both on employ-
ment and unemployment rate. Namely, on one 
hand, we recorded a positive relation between 
labour taxation and employment rate and, on 
the other hand, yet stronger, negative associa-
tion between tax wedge and both measures 
of unemployment (for further details on this 
issue see, for example, Dolenc and Laporšek, 
2010 and Dolenc et. al., 2011). With respect to 
second institutional variable, fi ndings suggest 
that the presence of trade unions (and through 
that higher level of workers protection) has fa-
vourable relation with both employment and 
unemployment (for details see, for example, 
Checchi et al., 2002).
CONCLUSIONS
The paper examines the issue of fl exi-
curity in the EU Member States and stud-
ies relationships between fl exicurity policy 
components and labour market outcomes. 
As fl exicurity policy elements present com-
plex entities, which are diffi cult to measure 
and compare between countries, we focus 
on four representative labour market in-
stitutions, one for each fl exicurity compo-
nent (i.e., EPL index, participation in LLL 
programmes, government expenditures for 
ALMPs and expenditures on PLMPs as a 
proxy for UBs), for 20 EU Member States 
over the 1990–2008 period. 
The empirical estimates point on the ex-
istence of large gaps in the level of implemen-
tation of fl exicurity policies across the EU 
Member States. To the idea of fl exicurity at 
most adapt Nordic countries, which simulta-
neously record the highest employment pro-
tection fl exibility and the highest investment 
in ALMPs and LLL programmes, while 
ensuring generous UBs. The most distant 
from the fl exicurity idea are the NMS along 
Italy and Greece, where a particular problem 
present low expenses for ALMPs, unaware-
ness of LLL importance and low income re-
placement during unemployment. Low level 
of security of workers can be also observed 
among Anglo-Saxon countries, which are, on 
the other hand, characterised with the most 
fl exible employment regulations. This is in 
line with Laporšek and Dolenc (2011), who 
also showed that countries with the high-
est level of compliance with the fl exicurity 
concept record the highest labour market 
outcomes and vice versa.
The need of further development of 
fl exicurity for labour market performance 
was confi rmed also by the panel regression 
estimates. As the regression estimates were 
similar across fi xed and random effects 
and across different model specifi cations, 
we can confirm robustness of our find-
ings for each of the dependent variables. 
Concerning the employment rate, regres-
sion estimates suggest that it is negatively 
associated with the EPL index. This is in 
line with other studies which found that 
rigid employment regulations reduce will-
ingness of fi rms to hire new workers (see 
Section 3). Negative relation between the 
two could be mitigated with ALMPs and 
LLL. As it follows from the estimates, such 
activation measures positively associate 
with employment rate. This may indicate 
that activation measures, aimed at enhanc-
ing human capital of workers, increase their 
probability to employ. These fi ndings were 
implicitly confi rmed also by estimates for 
unemployment and long-term unemploy-
ment rates. Although they give ambiguous 
results for EPL (probably due to drawbacks 
related to the measure of employment regu-
lation rigidity), they show that both expendi-
tures for ALMPs and participation in LLL 
programmes may be associated with lower 
unemployment and long-term unemploy-
ment rate. This again confi rms that these 
programmes, by encouraging investments 
in skills, prequalifi cation and knowledge, 
increase the quality of human capital and 
therefore facilitate transition to employ-
ment and increase the possibility of re-em-
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ployment. On the other hand, the relation 
between unemployment and expenditures 
for PLMPs tends to be positive, implying 
that generous income replacements for un-
employment may infl uence the intensity of 
fl ows from unemployment to employment.
To conclude, our fi ndings confi rm that 
balanced fl exicurity policies are of a spe-
cial importance for further development of 
European labour markets and economies. 
European countries should continue with 
the fl exibilisation of employment regula-
tion, simultaneously enhancing the security 
system and, most importantly, developing 
comprehensive strategies of LLL and ef-
fective ALMPs, together with conditions 
for their implementation. Most importantly, 
each of the EU countries must shape its own 
fl exicurity pathway that best suits the spe-
cifi c needs of its labour market, with special 
attention put on fi nding the right balance 
between the needs of both employees and 
employers and at the same time assuring 
macroeconomic stability. Appropriate and 
balanced fl exicurity policies are of especial 
importance for the labour market develop-
ments in times of crises. Further research 
could therefore try to evaluate how have 
countries with different levels of compli-
ance to fl exicurity concept responded to the 
current economic and fi nancial crisis. 
Findings of this paper present an impor-
tant contribution to the existing research on 
the effect of various labour market institu-
tions on labour market performance. The 
added value of the paper, comparing to 
existing research, is the analysis of com-
pliance to fl exicurity and of the relation 
between its policy components and labour 
market outcomes, which includes also the 
NMS. The latter were due to lack of data left 
out of most existing research. Nevertheless, 
the paper still faces several problems. 
Firstly, lack of a uniform defi nition of fl exi-
curity and, consequently, issue of shaping 
and selecting all-embracing indicator of 
a multidimensional policy of fl exicurity. 
Secondly, problems related to an effective 
measure of EPL rigidity, discussed also by 
Boeri and van Ours (2008). Furthermore, 
diffi culties linked to obtaining reliable and 
appropriate measures of development of 
LLL programmes, especially among NMS. 
With regard to methodology, problems re-
lated to potential endogeneity or omission 
of relevant variables – consequently, we 
can not adequately defi ne the direction of 
causality between fl exicurity components 
and labour market performance, but merely 
their associations. In order to solve the cau-
sality problem, a study that in detail analy-
ses labour market reforms with respect to 
fl exicurity and their subsequent impact on 
labour market and economic outcomes is 
needed. This paper therefore presents an 
introduction to a more comprehensive study 
that would deal with these issues.
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Sažetak
UTJEČU LI MJERE FLEKSIGURNOSTI NA REZULTATE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? 
ANALIZA ZEMALJA ČLANICA EU-a
Suzana Laporšek, Primož Dolenc
Fakultet za menadžment
Kopar, Slovenija
U radu se analizira pojam fl eksigurnosti u državama članicama EU-a i proučava odnos 
između komponenata fl eksigurnosti (npr. radno zakonodavstvo, programi cjeloživotnog 
učenja i aktivne i pasivne mjere tržišta rada) kao i učinak tržišta rada (npr. stope zaposlen-
osti, nezaposlenosti i dugoročne nezapolsenosti) u 20 zemalja članica EU-a tijekom razdo-
blja od 1990. do 2008. godine. Regresijske analize pokazale su da su troškovi za aktivne 
mjere zapošljavanja i sudjelovanje u programima cjeloživotnog učenja pozitivno povezani 
s rezultatima na tržištu rada jer povećavaju ljudski kapital radnika, pa stoga povećavaju 
i njihovu mogućnost zapošljavanja. S druge strane, velikodušne mjere pasivne politike na 
tržištu rada u negativnoj su korelaciji s prijelazima iz nezaposlenosti u zaposlenost. Manje 
su eksplicitni rezultati u pogledu odnosa sa strogoćom zakona o zaštiti prava radnika. 
Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju na važnost kreiranja uravnoteženih mjera fl eksigurnosti za 
daljnji razvoj europskih tržišta rada i europskih gospodarstava.
Ključne riječi: fl eksigurnost, rezultati na tržištu rada, mjere na tržištu rada, empirijska 
analiza, Europska unija.
 
